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The term "justify" - even though it is derived from the most
noble virtue of Justice - evokes an adverse connotation since it is-
sues from a situation negative in character and premises a need to
respond. The deed, if it needs to be justified, seems to be harmful
and its consequences undesirable. It must be kept in mind, however,
that the defense of justification assumes a situation where (1) the
accused, through no fault of his own, was confronted with but two
alternatives each of which will trigger harmful consequences and one
of which was a violation of the law, and (2) the accused had to im-
mediately select one of the two courses to follow. If we are mindful
of these prerequisites we will be able to maintain a sharper focus on
a discussion of the defense of justification and will better compre-
hend why its availability is restricted.
II. Justification: A Basic Definition and Description
The defense of justification - or as it is frequently designated,
the defense of necessity - posits a denial of criminal responsibility
for behavior that is the voluntary choice of the actor. Usually, it
arises when a specific justification defense is presented such as self-
defense, defense of others, defense of property, or the exercise of
public authority.1 This article examines the general defense of justifi-
cation as it is asserted by those who deny criminal responsibility for
activity which would otherwise be criminal behavior.
The general defense of justification is usually thought of as the
statutory designation of what had traditionally been termed in the
common law as the defense of necessity.' It might be said that the
I. See Annot., 41 ALR 4th 773, 777 (1985).
The defenses of justification, necessity and competing harms are related, al-
though commentators disagree about their relationship; some calling necessity a
type of justification defense, others treating necessity as a broad category encom-
passing self-defense, defense of others, and defense of habitation. The defense of
necessity is found in commdn law and even earlier, in the Bible; the modern
equivalent of common-law necessity is said to be statutes on competing harms or
choice of evils. [footnotes omitted].
Id.
2. The Model Penal Code begins the general definition of justification with the phrase:
"(I) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary. ... MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02
(1962). Section 35.05 of the New York Penal Law provides that conduct which would other-
wise constitute an offense is justifiable when: " .. . (2) Such conduct is necessary. ... NY
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975). See also Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Neces-
sity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOL-
OGY, 289 (1974) [hereinafter Arnolds & Garland]. "Courts sometimes use the term justifica-
tion as a synonym for necessity. Justification, however, is a generic term which may comprise
beside necessity, the defense of self-defense, defense of others, defense of property or execution
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term "justification" is somewhat more apt than "necessity;" the lat-
ter is somewhat misleading since the term "necessity" reflects the
notion that the act of the accused was inevitable and unavoidable
rather than the voluntary choice of the actor.3 The defense of justifi-
cation is also frequently described by the process of its application
such as "choice of evils,"'4 "competing harms,"'5 "compulsion, ' 6 "bal-
ancing of harms,' '7 "balancing of evils,"8 "balancing of competing
values," 9 and "confession and avoidance."10 At the outset, the de-
fense of "justification" should be distinguished from the defense of
''excuse."
To justify does not mean to excuse; justification is a circum-
stance which actually exists and which makes harmful conduct
proper and non-criminal, while excuse is a circumstance which
excuses the actor from criminal liability even though the actor
was technically not justified in doing what he did. Examples of
excuses are mistake and duress.
The rationale behind the excuse defenses was stated by Mr.
Justice Holmes: "Detached reflection cannot be expected in the
presence of an uplifted knife" [Brown v. United States, 256 U.S.
335 (1921)]. The rationale behind the justification defense is
that one should not be punished where his act of breaking the
law prevents more evil than it causes. The difference is the same
as between being forgivably wrong and being right or between
being pardoned and being praised. Neither pardon, mitigation
nor excuse can substitute for justification for where a person has
acted meritoriously (justification) he has no need of
forgiveness. 1
The view that a transgression which is justified is not only-non-
of official duty." Id.
3. See Tiffany & Anderson Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52
DEN. L.J. 840, 841 (1975).
4. The Model Penal Code supplies this very label to the title of its basic provision:
"Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
382 (1972) [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT]. "When the pressure of circumstances presents
one with a choice of evils, the law prefers that he avoid the greater evil by bringing about the
lesser evil." Id.
5. State v. Dorsey, 118 N.H. 844, 395 A.2d 855 (1978).
6. United States v. Best, 476 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1979); State v. Greene, 5 Kan.
App.2d 698, 623 P.2d 933 (1981).
7. THE [ENGLISH] LAW COMMISSION, No. 83, CRIMINAL LAW, Report on Defenses of
General Application 19-32 (1977). See generally Low, JEFFRIES & BONNIE. CRIMINAL LAW
CASEBOOK & MATERIALS, 538-41 (1982) [hereinafter Low, JEFFRIES & BONNIE].
8. MODEL PENAL CODE, Section 3.02 Comment I(a). (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
9. State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000 (1980).
10. Id.
II. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 289-90.
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criminal but is, as well, legal, proper and even praiseworthy seems
inconsistent with the notion that the defense of justification involves
a "choice of evils" - for how can a violation of the law be consid-
ered proper? Such perceived inconsistentcy is illusory, even if less
obviously to the philosopher than to one familiar with cost/benefit
principles. Even so, perhaps the phrase "balancing of harms" is the
more apt description of the selection process undertaken by the
actor.
Low, Jeffries and Bonnie12 have concluded that those who base
their denial of criminal responsibility upon a defense of excuse may
generally be divided into two classes: (1) those who assert a lack of
criminal responsibility by reason of personal excuse, and (2) those
who assert a lack of criminal responsibility by reason of situational
excuse. The clearest example of personal excuse is insanity. The no-
tion of situational excuse is meant to suggest that an individual may
be excused if the situation in which he finds himself overbears his
otherwise normal abilities to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law. The doctrine of situational excuse, therefore, makes
allowance for abnormal situations as distinguished from abnormal
persons. The best example of situational excuse is duress.
Since both the defense of duress and the defense of necessity or
justification focus upon the external reality of the actor's situation
and the attitude of the actor concerning those realities, there is a
tendency to blur the historical common law distinction between the
two.13 Such a tendency is understandable since the defense of justifi-
cation and the defense of duress are each a type of situational de-
fense. Each defense asserts a lack of criminal responsibility by rea-
son of external circumstances. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in his 1980
opinion for the majority of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Bailey,"' utilized an example from the work of
LaFave and Scottis which helps to clarify the distinction: "Thus,
where A destroyed a dike because B threatened to kill him if he did
not, A would argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A de-
stroyed the dike in order to protect more valuable property from
flooding, A could claim a defense of necessity."' 6
Consequently, the external circumstances which provide the set-
ting for each of the two defenses must be examined, as well as the
12. See Low, JEFFRIES & BONNIE, supra note 7, at 36-45.
13. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
14. Id.
15. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4.
16. United States v. Bailey. 444 U.S. at 410.
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judgment of the actor. There is a difference, however, in the exami-
nation conducted to determine if either the defense of necessity or
the defense of duress is applicable. When examining whether A de-
stroyed the dike under duress, it is necessary to determine whether
the threat of serious bodily injury was realistic. Such a determina-
tion involves some consideration of the subjective judgment of the
actor but relies far more heavily upon the external circumstances of
the setting. On the other hand, when determining whether A de-
stroyed the dike out of necessity in order to protect more valuable
property from flooding, while still examining the external circum-
stances, it is the subjective judgment of the actor that is the object of
more urgent focus. It is also clear that the inquiry conducted into the
mind of the actor, when either of the situational defenses of justifica-
tion or duress is claimed, differs greatly from the study conducted
when a denial of criminal responsibility is asserted by reason of per-
sonal excuse, such as the personal incapacity or insanity of the
accused.
The defense of justification is, of course, unacceptable to the
positivist who asserts that the law, the express command of the sov-
ereign, must be obeyed and that no balancing of competing moral
notions will justify violation of the law. 17 "In applying the law [how-
ever], courts must take a moral stand, even if that stand is that mo-
rality should not be considered." 8 "This influence of morality in the
allocation of punishment may be distinct from-the positivist separa-
tion of law and morality. Although the existence of law may be inde-
pendent of its moral goodness, the application or enforcement of law
may entail moral considerations." 1 9
A utilitarian, on the other hand, might consider the defense of
justification to be a viable concept and procedure.2" The utilitarian
demands that law provide the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. Justification, then, would be a complete defense to the utili-
tarian if the evil (value) selected by the accused produced greater
happiness for a greater number. 1
17. What Should Judges Know About Justice?, J. Willard O'Brien, Executive Director,
Villanova University Law School Institute of Law Morality, New Judges' Seminar (December
II, 1985).
18. Comment, Necessity Defined: A New Role in the Criminal Defense System, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 409, 410-11 (1981) [hereinafter Necessity Defined].
19. Id. at 410-11 n.5.
20. "We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be
punished in some way or other for doing it - if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow
creatures - if not'by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience." J.S. MILL. UTILITARI-
ANISM, 60 (Piest Ed. 1957).
21. "By the principle of utility is meant that principle that approves or disapproves of
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Utilitarian philosophers acknowledge that the law tends to em-
body certain moral requirements standing high on the scale of
social utility, indicating that conformity to the law is normally
of paramount obligation. Nevertheless, there could be cases in
which some other social duty is so important that it may over-
rule the obligation to adhere to any one of these laws.
22
It follows, of course, that the focus of the utilitarian is not upon the
perspective and selection process of the actor but solely upon the re-
sult produced by the selection.
The defense of justification has in recent times received a great
deal of attention, largely by reason of the prominence or notoriety of
the protestors who seek to use it as a defense. As a result, the de-
fense of justification is frequently confused with the doctrine of pro-
test known as civil disobedience. This article seeks to distinguish the
defense of justification from the doctrine of civil disobedience.
Ill. Justification: Distinguished From Civil Disobedience
The concept of justification as a defense assumes that every law
has such stature as to compel compliance unless compliance will pro-
duce an evil greater than the failure to comply. Aquinas wrote that
"an unjust law is no law at all"; 3 this was the view of Aristotle and
Augustine as well.24 Consequently, it might seem there would be no
need to obey an unjust law. Indeed, Aquinas posited that a duty to
conscience transcends the obligation to the state, but emphasized
that while an act contrary to the law may be morally motivated, the
actor is not immune from punishment. Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes has expressed this notion for the modern age as follows:
When one's belief collides with the power of the State, the lat-
ter is Supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish that happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in
other words, to promote or oppose the happiness." See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES 01 MORALS AND LEUiSLATION 2 (Reprint of 1823 Ed., Hafner Library). See also
NecessitI , Defined, supra note 18, at 433: "The emphasis on a cost-benefit analysis is the ra-
tionale of the necessity defense as found in the Model Penal Code and the various state neces-
sity statutes. Absent certain qualifying factors [codified only in the necessity statutes and not
delineated in the Model Code] the necessity defense will be appropriate if the act's social
benefit outweighs its cost." Id. [footnotes omitted].
22. Necessity Defined, supra note 18, at 412 n.14 quoting TS. MILL, UTILITARIANISM,
supra note 19, at 78.
23. See Hermann, Justice and Order. A Preliminary Examination of the Limits of
Law, 45 WAShL L. REV. 335, 336 (1970) citing 28 T. Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 61, 129
(Blackfriers Transl. 1963).
24. Id. at 337 n.9.
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follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power
higher than the State has always been maintained.
2 5
It is the acceptance of this alternative - "submission or punish-
ment" - that distinguishes, and, in reality, divides those who em-
brace the doctrine of justification to avoid criminal responsibility
from those who openly embrace the punishment for their refusal to
obey. Most people - and some authorities - consider them as
equivalent concepts. Thus, it would seem that the distinction is as
obscure as it is fundamental and thereby merits more careful
attention.
This century has witnessed the zenith of the doctrine of civil
disobedience. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Martin Luther
King, Jr., perhaps the most effective apostles of civil disobedience in
all of history, achieved enormous change.2 6 The parallels of Gandhi
and King may be seen not only in the non-violent method they em-
braced to accomplish change but, as well, in the entrenched nature
of the forces they confronted. For example, each establishment that
fought them was able to manipulate the law to its own advantage
since the establishment controlled the courts. Moreover, the efforts
of both Gandhi and King were resisted in some measure by their
own people: in India by the hierarchy of Indian administrators who
served English masters and in the South by those blacks who had
achieved affluence and had become intertwined with the establish-
ment, as well as a far greater number who were simply complacent.
Gandhi, who had been trained in the law and had achieved
prominence in its practice in South Africa, abandoned the profession
at age thirty to contest the unjust laws of discrimination in South
Africa with a weapon for which he devised the term Satyagraha.
Gandhi defined and described the term:
Its root meaning is "holding on to truth," hence truth-force. I
have also called it love-force or soul-force. In the application of
Satyagraha, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of
truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent,
but-that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympa-
thy. For what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be
error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the
25. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, J., dissenting)
(emphasis supplied).
26. Mohandas Gandhi was not simply in the forefront of the movement to secure inde-
pendence for India from British rule, but he had been the charismatic leader of that movement
for almost three decades when India finally gained independence in 1947 and became a sover-
eign nation.
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doctrine came to mean vindication of truth, not by the infliction
of suffering on the opponent, but on one's self.
2 7
After fifteen years, Gandhi had effected great improvement, but
he then returned to his homeland where he employed the same
weapon, Satyagraha. There he quickly became the cherished leader
of those who opposed English domination.
Gandhi was eventually charged with sedition. When he ad-
dressed the court on March 23, 1922, just prior to the imposition of
sentence, the essence of his doctrine became his subject:
I want to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my
faith. It is also the last article of my creed . . . . Affection can-
not be manufactured or regulated by law. If one has an affection
for a person or system, one should be free to give the fullest
expression to his disaffection, so long as he does not contem-
plate, promote or incite the violence. But the section under
which . . . I [am] charged is one under which mere promotion
of disaffection is a crime. I have studied some of the cases tried
under it, and I know that some of the most loved of India's pa-
triots have been convicted under it. I consider it a privilege,
therefore, to be charged under that section. I have endeavored to
give in their briefest outline the reasons for my disaffection. I
have no personal ill-will against any single administrator, much
less can I have any disaffection toward the King's person. But I
hold it to be a virtue to be disaffected toward a government
which in its totality hag done more harm to India than any pre-
vious system . . . . Holding such a belief, I consider it to be a
sin to have affection for the system. And it has been a precious
privilege for me to be able to write what I have in the various
articles, tendered as evidence against me. . . . In fact, I believe
that I have rendered a service to India and England by showing
in non-cooperation the way out of the unnatural state in which
both are living. In my humble opinion, non-cooperation with evil
is as much a duty as is cooperation with good. But in the past,
non-cooperation has been deliberately expressed in violence to
the evil doer. I am endeavoring to show to my countrymen that
violent non-cooperation only multiplies evil and that as evil can
only be sustained by violence, withdrawal of support of evil re-
quires complete abstension from violence. Non-violence implies
voluntary submission to the penalty for non-cooperation with
evil. I am here, therefore, to invite and submit cheerfully to the
highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is
27. Gandhi: A Plea for the Severest Penalty upon Conviction for Sedition, reprinted in
Tim LAW AS LITERATURE 459-60 (E. London Ed. 1960).
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a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest
duty of a citizen.
2 8
The eventual monumental success of Gandhi and his policy of
non-violence was, of course, of historic proportion. One should not,
however, simply admire the enormity of the personal determination
and courage of Gandhi, but should also consider the extent to which
the policy of non-violence was the effective cause of the English
decision.
Later in the same century, Martin Luther King, in his splendid
book Why We Can't Wait,29 described the historic bloodless 30 revolu-
tion in the United States. He noted that while the philosophy of non-
violent direct action did not originate in the United States, it found a
natural home here, where refusing to cooperate with injustice was an
honorable tradition and a device, in the form of boycotts and pro-
tests, that had confounded the British monarchy. Dr. King con-
tended that there is something in the American ethos that responds
to the strength of moral force. Dr. King was so determined to per-
suade America of the efficacy of civil disobedience, as distinguished
from justification for violation of the law, that he would not permit
anyone to demonstrate who had not first been convinced that he
could accept and endure violence without retaliating.
Dr. King and his associates eventually felt a duty to disobey an
order of the court because it was clear beyond dispute - and behind
the courthouse smirk - that the injunction method had become the
leading instrument to block the direct action civil rights drive. It had
been used by the power structure in a maliciously effective, pseudo-
legal manner to quell legitimate moral protests. The civil disobedi-
ence took place only after Dr. King announced that he and his col-
leagues were not anarchists advocating lawlessness, but that they
could not, in good conscience, obey the direction of the Alabama
courts because those courts had misused the judicial process to per-
petuate the injustice of segregation. When asked: "How can you ad-
vocate breaking some laws and obeying others?", Dr. King explained
that there are two types of laws: just and unjust and he would be the
first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a
moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral
28. Id. at 461-65.
29. M.L. KING. WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, (1963). The discussion, infra of the princi-
ples, programs and conclusions of Dr. King are derived from this work.
30. The irony seems absolute when historians describe the legal and cultural revolution
he led as "bloodless" since that leadership caused his assassination on January 15, 1968.
JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE
responsibility to disobey unjust laws. He was asked: "What is the
difference between the two? How does one determine how a law is
just or unjust?" His reply was an echo of Aquinas: A just law is a
man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God;
an unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. It
was, as noted, Aquinas echoing Augustine when he said: "An unjust
law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural
law."
Dr. King contended that any law that degrades the human per-
sonality is unjust. As a result, all segregation statutes are unjust be-
cause segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.
Thus, Dr. King was able to urge obedience to the 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education decision"1 but also to urge men to disobey segre-
gation ordinances which were in their very essence morally wrong.
Sometimes, he said, a law is just on its face and unjust in its applica-
tion. For instance, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance
which requires a permit for a parade; but such an ordinance becomes
unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens
their First Amendment privileges of peaceful assembly and protest.
Dr. King did not advocate evading or defying the law, as would
the rabid segregationist, for his actions would then lead to anarchy.
Rather, he enthusiastically preached and fervently practiced the
principle that one who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lov-
ingly, and with the willingness to accept the penalty. Dr. King urged
the notion that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells
him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment
in order to arouse the conscience of the community in its injustice, is
in reality expressing the highest respect for the law.32
It is fortunate that the civil disobedience preached and prac-
ticed by Dr. King carried the day since there were but two alternate
courses. One, the force of complacency, had been for the most part
repudiated. The other force was one of bitterness and hatred. This
was a force that came dangerously close to advocating violence, and
a force expressed in the various black nationalist groups, as exempli-
fied by the Muslim movement, which had concluded that the white
man was an incorrigible "devil." Thus, the country can be relieved
that the doctrine of non-violence and civil disobedience prevailed.
Since the basic notions of the defense are now somewhat
clearer, this analysis flows, quite naturally, to the inquiry that is the
31. Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. King, supra note 29, at 82-84.
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very essence of the defense: Confronted by two evils, how is a deter-
mination made as to which is the greater and which is the lesser?
This inquiry can be more effectively addressed if a review of the
leading decisions follows a selective examination of specific justifica-
tion statutes.
IV. Justification as a Statutory Provision
While a number of jurisdictions3" have enacted a necessity or
justification statute, the statutes most scrutinized by the commenta-
tors are the Model Penal Code 3  and what has been described as the
New York model.35 The general36 justification section of the Model
Penal Code, namely section 3.02, provides:
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils.
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid an evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law de-
fining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the of-
fense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing
33. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (Supp. 1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-504 (Supp. 1985); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702(1) (1973); Delaware: DEL
CODE ANN. tit. II § 463 (1974); Hawaii: HAWAII REV, STAT. § 702-302 (1976); Illinois: ILl.
ANN. STAT. tit. 38 § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030
(Bobbs-Merrill 1985); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 103 (1964); Missouri: Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (1979); New Hampshire: N.H. REV, STAT. ANN. § 627.3 (1974); New
York: N.Y. PENAl. LAW § 35.05(2) (Consol. 1984); Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.200
(1985); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1983); Texas: TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1974); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 (1953); Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 1982); See also Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(5) and
(6) (1984); New Jersey: NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:3-10 (1982); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-05-01 (1985).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
35. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975).
36. While we focus upon the general justification provision of the Model Penal Code,
there are, of course, further justification provisions that relate to specific situations: Section
3.03. Execution of Public Duty. Section 3.04. Use of Force in Self-Protection.Section 3.05. Use
of Force for the Protection of Other Persons. Section 3.06. Use of Force for the Protection of
Property. Section 3.07. Use of Force in Law Enforcement. Section 3.08. Use of Force by
Persons With Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline or Safety of Others. Section 3.09.
Mistake of Law as to Unlawfulness of Force or Legality of Arrest; Reckless or Negligent Use
of Otherwise Justifiable Force; Reckless or Negligent Injury or Risk of Injury to Innocent
Persons. Section 3.10. Justification in Property Crimes.
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about the situation requiring a choice of evils or in appraising
the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this
Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to estab-
lish culpability.
The general provision of the New York justification statute
provides:
§ 35.05 Justification; generally
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this
article defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which
would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not crimi-
nal when:
2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to
avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to
occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through
no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, accord-
ing to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality the desira-
bility and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the
desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense in issue. The necessity and justifia-
bility of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertain-
ing only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in
its general application or with respect to its application to a par-
ticular class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever evidence re-
lating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is of-
fered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if estab-
lished, constitute a defense.37
The pivotal phrase "choice of evils" describes the focus of the
scrutiny applied to a violation which the accused claims is justified.
The common law required that the relationship of the harm commit-
ted to the harm avoided be such that the evil inflicted by the act of
the accused was not "disproportionate" to the evil avoided, whereas
the Model Penal Code requires the harm avoided to be "greater
than" the harm done. The New York Penal Law, however, requires
that "the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be pre-
vented by the statute."38 A further significant difference between the
Model Penal Code and the New York model is the more stringent
37. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 35.05 (McKinney 1975).
38. Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 3, at 843.
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requirement of the New York model that the conduct under study
have actually been "necessary" while the Model Penal Code confers
the defense upon "conduct which the actor believes to be necessary
The proposal to codify the doctrine of necessity in the federal
code3 9 was less than successful. The 1971 Final Report of the Com-
mission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws deleted the codified
necessity defense and simply stated: "Except as otherwise provided,
justification or excuse under this chapter is a defense."' 0 The final
draft of the Commission rejected the "choice of evils" rule because
"even the best [of] statutory formulations . . . is a potential source
of unwarranted difficulty in ordinary cases ... .*" In 1974, the En-
glish Law Commission recommended that Parliament abolish "any
defense of necessity [which exists] at common law. '""2
The rejection by commissions both in the United States and in
England reflects, perhaps, a lingering hesitancy, if not settled reluc-
tance, by some to accept the concept of justification. The basis for
this reservation is logical and is premised upon the fundamental
principle that each party or cause in a trial shall enjoy the same
rights and privileges and must be subject to the same restrictions
and demands. The defense of justification, however, would seem to
encroach upon that principle.
The parties to a criminal trial are the government and the ac-
cused. The government may only proceed to a prosecution for con-
duct that has been earlier pronounced by the legislature to be illegal,
in a statute that must be precise in definition and clear and specific
in terms.' It is not enough that the prosecutor, upon his own motion
or in response to an outraged citizenry, decides that the common
weal would be admirably served by the imposition of sanctions for
conduct which may be generally acknowledged and conceded to be
distasteful or even immoral. Rather, it is fundamental that the pros-
39. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, Study
Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, § 608 (1970).
40. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS, § 601(1) (1971).
41. Id., § 601 (comment).
42. See Low. JEFFRIES & BONNIE, supra note 7, at 538-41.
43. As Low, Jeffries and Bonnie describe, the federal system in the early 19th century
rejected the tradition of the common law and embraced the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
The states, however, proceeded with prosecution based upon statutes as well as upon judicial
decision with an implied authority in the courts to create new crimes as the need to punish
anti-social behavior arose. The state courts have in the past century rarely proceeded to prose-
cution without either statute or judicial precedent prohibiting the misconduct charged. See
Low, JEFFRIES & BONNIE, supra note 7, at 36-45.
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ecution may not proceed upon such vague feelings, nebulous notions,
or general reactions.
Naturally, the question arises - if the prosecution is so re-
stricted, why should the accused be able to present a defense consist-
ing solely of the moral doubt, philosophical disagreement, and ethi-
cal dissent which some perceive to be the essence of the defense of
justification? - for how else to characterize the selection which
completes the choice between the two evils perceived by the accused.
Thus, it may be claimed that an accused who relies upon the defense
of justification would appear to have an advantage. Even those who
reject such a claim would have to concede the procedural restrictions
appear inconsistent if the duty to be precise and specific is imposed
upon the prosecution but not upon the accused.
Moreover, the fraternal twin of inconsistency - uncertainty -
would also seem to issue from the defense of justification since it is a
defense which necessarily requires ad hoc application. "The peculi-
arity of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility
of formulating it with any approach to precision.""" Uncertainty is
the nemesis of the criminal law for court and cifizen alike. That un-
desirable feature would seem to be fostered, however, if the same
two evils confront two different actors and each actor elects differ-
ently. Even assuming that each of the two actors made the same
selection, despite the refusal of a jury nullification instruction,"
there is no reason to think the verdict would be similar. The defense
of justification would enable each accused to delineate all of the fac-
tors that shaped his perspective upon the one evil, and then all of the
factors that shaped his perspective upon the other evil, and, finally,
all of the factors that formed a part of the selection process as he
chose between the two evils. The rhetorical conclusion is, of course,
that there are as many varieties of the defense of justification as
there are actors and situations. As expressed almost a century and a
half ago in New Jersey:
44. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 232, at 728 (2d ed. 1961).
45. The doctrine of jury nullification has again, in the current era of demonstration
prosecutions, been rejected. That doctrine held that the defendant has the right to have the
jury instructed that the jurors have the right to set aside the instructions of the judge and to
reach a verdict of acquittal based on their consciences. It is now clear that when a defense of
justification is presented, the court proceeds properly if it instructs the jury that it can acquit
only if the act charged was necessary to avoid a greater injury and the felon has no other
adequate means to prevent the harm. The trial court thereby recognizes the competing values.
See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 2, at 296-98. It has also been observed that "the jury
system permits the Goddess of Justice a glimpse from beneath her blindfold." Bumbarger v.
Kaminsky, 311 Pa. Super. 177, 183, 457 A.2d 552, 555 (1983).
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It is essentially a private and not a public or official right. It is a
right not susceptible of any very precise definition, for the mode
and manner and the extent of its exercise must depend on the
nature and degree of the necessity that calls it into action, and
this cannot be determined until the necessity is made to
appear.46
V. Justification Decisions
The Law is always termed and considered an institution - but
if one were to consider the Law a person, it could be said that the
law as found in the statutes is the heart, while the law as disclosed
by the decisions is the soul. The conclusion follows that an examina-
tion of the statutes must be complemented by a study of the deci-
sions interpreting those statutes.
Since justification, in recent decades, is most frequently seen as
the defense of the demonstrator, a study of the leading cases of the
last quarter century involving justification reveals the same basic no-
tions regularly repeated as each succeeding cause produces a cluster
of decisions upon the defense. The anti-war protests were followed
by anti-nuclear demonstrations which preceded the bitter abortion
controversy - an issue which seems to have triggered intense pro-
tests and demonstrations from each side of that controversy. While
the protestors inspired most of the judicial analysis of justification,
an examination of certain other decisions, for example, the prosecu-
tion of a deprogrammer and prosecutions for smuggling
pharmaceuticals, also generated insightful discussion by courts
throughout the country.
A. Anti-War Protests
1. United States v. Moylan.4 7-The citation to this prosecu-
tion for the removal of Selective Service records from the Local
Board of Catonsville, Maryland, obscures the notoriety of the case
since the citation does not note that Mary Moylan was but one of
the "Catonsville 9," whose number included the Berrigan brothers.
All of the defendants admitted that they entered the office of the
Local Board of the Selective Service and removed a number of files
to an adjacent parking lot where they destroyed the files with
46. Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714 (1848), affd sub nom. American Print Works v.
Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 (1851), quoted in Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. 61, 69,
471 A.2d 462, 465 (1984) rev'd, - Pa. -_, 498 A.2d 806 (1985).
47. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) cert. denied 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
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napalm. 8
It was necessary for the prosecution to prove, if the defendants
were to be convicted, that the defendants had acted "knowingly" or
"willfully." The defendants urged upon both the trial court and the
circuit court an interpretation of the word "willful" that mirrored
the defense of necessity or justification even though the defendants
did not precisely express the claim that their act was the choice of
two evils.
Defendants asserted:
(!) The word "willful" as used in the statutes was the expression
of a requirement that a bad purpose or motive, as defendants
performed their acts, was a condition precedent to a conviction.
(2) They had acted with good motives, i.e., to protest a war
which was illegal and immoral. (3) They could not, therefore,
have "willfully" violated the statutes."
The trial judge refused to so define "willful" in his charge to the
jury, but instead instructed that "willful intent" is (1) the intent on
the part of the accused to commit the proscribed acts, (2) with
knowledge that the acts were a violation of the statute. 50
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge
had properly rejected the expansive interpretation of the term "will-
ful" urged by the defendants and had correctly defined for the jury
the term "willful." The circuit court noted that:
[T]o read the term "willfully" to require a bad purpose would
be to confuse the concept of intent with that of motive ....
[W]hatever motive may have led them to do the act is not rele-
vant to the question of the violation of the statutes, but is rather
an element proper for the judge's consideration in sentencing."
Earlier in this work it was stated that the defense of justification
may not overlook the principle that criminal liability requires the
concurrent presence of an evil meaning mind and an evil doing hand.
It was later noted that when A destroyed the dike to protect more
valuable property from flooding, he was not, under the doctrine of
justification, criminally responsible because he did not have the pre-
requisite evil meaning mind. The defendants asserted that by reason
of what they viewed to be a noble motive, they did not have the
prerequisite mens rea to meet the requirement of "willfulness." The
48. Id. at 1003.
49. Id. at 1004.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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circuit court agreed that mens rea was a prerequisite of "willfulness"
but noted that the defendants had not acted under any mistake
which might have negated the required mens rea but instead, by
their own admission, purposely performed the acts with knowledge
that the acts were a violation of the statute. 2
U.S. Circuit Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, speaking for the court,
concluded the Moylan opinion by addressing the undercurrent pre-
sent throughout the proceeding, namely, the appeal of the defend-
ants to morality as justification for their conduct:
From the earliest times when man chose to guide his rela-
tions with fellow men by allegiance to the rule of law rather
than force, he has been faced with the problem how best to deal
with the individual in society who through moral conviction con-
cluded that a law with which he was confronted was unjust and
therefore must not be followed. Faced with the stark reality of
injustice, men of sensitive conscience and great intellect have
sometimes found only one morally justified path, and that path
led then inevitably into conflict with established authority and
its laws. Among philosophers and religionists throughout the
ages there has been an incessant stream of discussion as to
when, if at all, civil disobedience, whether by passive refusal to
obey a law or by its active breach, is morally justified. However,
they have been in general agreement that while in restricted cir-
cumstances a morally motivated act contrary to law may be
ethically justified, the action must be non-violent and the actor
must accept the penalty for his action. In other words, it is com-
monly conceded that the exercise of a moral judgment based
upon individual standards does not carry with it legal justifica-
tion or immunity from punishment for breach of the law.
The defendants' motivation in the instant case - the fact
that they engaged in a protest in the sincere belief that they
were breaking the law in good cause - cannot be acceptable
legal defense or justification.
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations
as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit
themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite
chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every indi-
vidual the option of disregarding with impunity any law which
by his personal standard was judged morally untenable. Tolera-
tion of such conduct would not be democratic, as appellants
52. Id.
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claim, but inevitably anarchic.5
Judge Sobeloff then pondered, as if to address the inconsistency and
uncertainty that were earlier addressed in this article as the attend-
ant characteristics of the defense of necessity:
If these defendants were to be absolved from guilt because of
their moral certainty that the war in Viet Nam is wrong, would
not others who might commit breaches of the law to demon-
strate their sincere belief that the country is not prosecuting the
war vigorously enough be entitled to acquittal? 5
He concludes, of course, that either protestant must answer for a
breach of the law.55
2. United States v. Kroncke.5 -The defendants in Kroncke
were also charged with, and admitted, that they had forcibly entered
the Local Board of Selective Service and removed Selective Service
records with the intent to destroy them. Unlike the Moylan defend-
ants, however, they squarely responded to the prosecution with the
defense of justification."
The trial court had permitted the defendants to call many wit-
nesses who, despite objection by the government, testified upon the
impact of the war upon the society of Viet Nam and the society of
Cambodia; the extent of the casualties in those countries; ecological
damage to Viet Nam; the extent to which draftees carried the bur-
53. Id. at 1008-09 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 1009.
55. The trial judge in Moylan allowed evidence to be freely admitted concerning the
motives of the defendants. The defendants also urged the trial judge to charge the jury that it
had the power to acquit even if the defendants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses or at
least to permit their counsel to make such an argument to the jury. The trial court rejected
this proposition. The circuit court affirmed the ruling of the trial court with an insightful
account of the history of modern rejection of the concept of jury nullification. Id. at 1005-07.
56. 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
57. The defendant Kroncke presented justification in not only the traditional form, i.e.,
that he believed his acts were necessary but also in the form of a First Amendment contention
that he was compelled by his religious convictions to bring to the attention of the public and
Congress the immorality and illegality of the Viet Nam war. The Circuit Court rejected this
assertion by noting: (I) Congress may prescribe and enforce certain conditions to control con-
duct which may be contrary to a person's religious belief in the interest of the public welfare,
citing Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 859 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); (2) Acceptance of religious practices as justification for the acts of the defend-
ants - would be to make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government would
exist only in name under such circumstances." Citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1879); (3) The defendant had failed to produce any evidence tending to show that the
application to him of the prohibition against destruction of selective service records would
result in an inhibition of the practice of his religion. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at
704.
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den of the war; and the effect of domestic protests and civil disobedi-
ence upon high government officials and the like. The defendants
themselves had testified as to their moral and religious reasons for
committing the acts charged against them. The trial judge during his
charge to the jury advised the jury that the defense presented was
one of justification and proceeded to define that defense, but then
instructed the jury that:
I now . . . strike all of the testimony offered by both defendants
except for their own personal testimony, and I strike that part
which attempts to rely on a justification on account of the Viet
Nam war . . . . Consequently, all that you have before you for
consideration are the facts concerning what occurred at Little
Falls, Minnesota, on the late evening of July 10, 1970.58
The circuit court rejected the contention of the defendants that
the trial court erred in refusing to submit the defense of justification
to the jury. The appellate court characterized the citations submitted
by the defendants as cases in which the defense of necessity was
presented, a defense which asserted the 1) existence of a reasonable
belief 2) that it was necessary to act 3) to protect life or health 4)
from a direct and immediate peril.59 Such a defense could not be
used when the purpose of the defendant was to effect a change in
governmental policies which, according to the actor, may result in a
future saving of lives.
The circuit court went on to note that the proposed Model Penal
Code extended the defense beyond the cases in which the evil to be
avoided is death or bodily harm. The court emphasized, however,
that even so broad an extension as proposed by the Model Penal
Code did not extend the defense to cases in which the relationship
between the violation and the good to be accomplished was as tenu-
ous and uncertain as in the case of the Kroncke defendants.6" The
court further observed that the Model Penal Code specifically lim-
ited the use of the defense to those situations where a legislative pur-
pose to exclude justification does not appear. Certainly, the court
opined, Congress did not intend that the statute would not be applied
to those who violated it for the purpose of challenging our nation's
foreign policy.
Subsequently, the court addressed the specific contention of the
defendants that their acts were justified because the war was im-
58. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at 700.
59. Id. at 701.
60. Id.
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moral. The court relied upon the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Moylan' and directly quoted the eloquent refuta-
tion of Judge Sobeloff in Moylan noted above.
3. State v. Marley.62-The Supreme Court of Hawaii in Mar-
ley reviewed the conviction by jury of eight individuals who had en-
gaged in a protest on the premises of the Honolulu office of the Hon-
eywell Corporation. One of those charged, the cited defendant,
Ronald J. Marley, was absent without leave from the United States
Navy. The other defendants established a sanctuary for him in the
Honeywell office where they read to the Honeywell staff a statement
concerning the participation by the corporation in the Viet Nam
war. While the defendants' activities were disruptive, the defendants
were completely non-violent and were only arrested when they re-
fused to depart at the normal business closing hour of the offices.
The defendants presented a number of defenses. They attacked
the constitutionality of the statutes under which they were prose-
cuted. 3 They proffered the testimony of an expert in International
Law as to his interpretation of International Law and his conclusion
that the weapons made by Honeywell were criminal. The court re-
jected this. 64 The relevance of this case is the rejection by the Ha-
waii Supreme Court of the "justification" defense and the further
rejection of the "necessity" defense.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii considered the justification de-
fense presented as an issue of first impression. The court noted that
the particular justification defense relied upon by the defendants was
based on case law which presented situations of the use of force to
prevent a criminal act but required that the criminal act that the
defendant sought to prevent was about to be committed upon or in
the presence of the defendant. 65 The court viewed the non-violent
conduct of the defendants as presenting a new question, namely,
whether the absence of force in their acts, or, indeed, the disparity in
the seriousness between the conduct of the defendants charged and
the alleged crimes of Honeywell, were distinctions of such significant
importance as to merit the deviation from the general rule that the
criminal act sought to be prevented must occur in the presence of
defendants. The court concluded:
61. 417 F.2d 1002 (1969).
62. 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
63. Id. at 454-63, 509 P.2d at 1099-1104.
64. Id. at 466-67, 509 P.2d at 1105.
65. Id. at 470, 509 P.2d at 1108.
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A presence requirement is the concomitant of the "immedi-
ate harm" requirement. The inevitable requirement of presence
stands, even where the criminal acts done to prevent harm to
self, others, or property do not involve force. Failure of the
courts to require presence would license persons to violate the
criminal statutes far more frequently. Such license is to be given
only in exceptional cases, and even when given is to be severely
limited to matters of intimate personal concern. Where the lim-
iting factor of intimate personal concern is absent from the sur-
rounding circumstances, as here, we see no reason to expand the
scope of the justification defense. To rule that a full justification
defense to the prosecution for commission of crime is established
even absent a presence requirement would . . . make each citi-
zen a judge of the criminality of all the acts of every other citi-
zen, with power to mete out sentence.
The only limitation that defendants can suggest as a control
of such untoward consequences is that the acts to be exonerated
be nonviolent and/or less serious than those allegedly to be pre-
vented or terminated. It is evident that these new limiting re-
quirements to replace "presence" are insufficient to prevent the
development, under the new suggested rules, of a vigilante
society."
The court went on to reject what it characterized as the "neces-
sity" or "choice of evils" defense. The court ruled that this defense
was not available to the defendants because:
The defendants had a third or further alternative that did not
involve violation of the law, namely other forms of non-criminal
protest. While a basic requirement is that the harm to be pre-
vented be imminent, any connection between the trespass of de-
fendants and the harm sought to be prevented was tenuous.
"Most importantly" the actions of defendants were not reasona-
bly designed to actually prevent the threat of the greater
harm. 6
7
66. Id. at 470-71, 509 P.2d at 1108.
67. The subsequent bases for the rejection of the defense, namely, the lack of "immi-
nency" (the connection between the acts of the defendants and the acts of Honeywell sought to
be prevented was dreadfully tenuous) and the lack of "necessity" (the actions of the defend-
ants were not realistically, i.e., reasonably, designed to actually prevent the threatened greater
harm) are of such substance and validity that it appears somewhat contrived to rely, for rejec-
tion of the defense of necessity, upon the suggestion that other forms of non-criminal protests
were available to defendants to enable them to dramatize their plight.
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B. Nuclear Power Plant Protests.
1. State v. Warshow.68-When a group of protestors con-
ducted a rally at the main gate of a nuclear power plant known as
Vermont Yankee and prevented workers from entering the plant,69
they were arrested and prosecuted for unlawful trespass. The plant
had been shut down for repairs and defendants sought to prevent its
return to operation. The defendants were prepared to rely upon the
defense of necessity and sought to present evidence relating to the
hazards of nuclear power plant operations by offering the testimony
of witnesses concerning the dangers of nuclear accidents and the ef-
fect of low level radiation." The trial judge ruled that the defense of
justification was not available in Vermont and on that basis excluded
the evidence defendants had tendered and refused the request of the
defendants for an instruction to the jury upon the issue of
necessity.
71
The Vermont Supreme Court divided upon the issue with two of
its five justices joining in the opinion of their Chief Justice, while one
justice concurred and another dissented. 72 Vermont did not have a
statute making the criminal defense of necessity available. Nonethe-
less, the justices were unanimous in their view that the defense was
available in Vermont under the common law. In fact, the opinion of
the majority likened it to "the classic defense of 'confession and
avoidance.' -17 The majority noted, however, an aspect of the defense
that underlies any study of the defense of necessity or justification:
68. 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000 (1980).
69. The cffort of the protestors to prevent workers from gaining access to the plant
calls to mind 1968 remarks of United States Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold:
IT~he fact that one is a dissenter with the right to express his opposition entitles
him to no special license . . . .Thus, I submit that one cannot rightly engage in
conduct which is otherwise unlawful merely because he intends that either that
conduct or the idea he wishes to express in the course of the conduct is intended
to manifest his dissent from some government policy. I cannot distinguish in
principle the legal quality of the determination to hold up a troop train to protest
the Viet Nam war or to block workmen from entering a segregated job site to
protest employment discrimination, from the determination to fire shots into a
civil rights leader's home to protest integration. The right to disagree - and to
manifest disagreement - . . . does not authorize them to carry on their cam-
paign of education and persuasion at the expense of someone else's liberty, or in
violation of some laws whose independent validity is unquestionable.
Dissent - 1968, 42 TULANE L. REv, 726, 733-34 (1968).
70. State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. at 23, 410 A.2d at 1001.
71. Id. at 23-24, 410 A.2d at 1001.
72. Chief Justice Barney authored the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Daley and Larrow. Justice Hill wrote a concurring opinion, while Justice Billings wrote a
dissenting opinion.
73. State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. at 24, 410 A.2d at 1001.
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The doctrine [of necessity] is one of specific application insofar
as it is a defense to criminal behavior. This is clear because if
the qualifications for the defense of necessity are not closely de-
lineated, the definition of criminal activity becomes uncertain
and even whimsical. The difficulty arises when words of general
and broad qualification are used to describe the special scope of
this defense.74
The majority then relied upon the treatise by LaFave and
Scott 75 for its compilation of the requirements of the defense:
I. There must be an emergency situation that has not been
caused by the actor. 2. The emergency must be so imminent and
compelling as to raise a reasonable expectation of harm to the
actor or to those he was protecting. 3. The emergency must pre-
sent no reasonable opportunity to avoid the injury without doing
the criminal act. 4. The harm posed by the emergency must
"outmeasure" the criminal wrong.76
The majority subsequently relaxed the initial requirement when it
stated that the danger need only "reasonably appear" to be immi-
nent. 77 Thus, the majority established in Vermont the less restricted
defense of justification: (1) by not declaring that the danger be actu-
ally necessary and simply requiring that the actor believe it neces-
sary, and (2) by stating that the impending danger merely "out-
measure" the harm done rather than "clearly outweigh" the
impending harm.78 Thus, the Model Penal Code version of the de-
fense of justification was adopted in Vermont by judicial decision.
The Warshow Court nonetheless affirmed the holding of the
trial court that the defense was unavailable based on its determina-
tion that:
low-level radiation and nuclear waste are not the types of immi-
nent danger classified as an emergency sufficient to justify crimi-
nal activity. To be imminent, a danger must be, or must reason-
able appear to be, threatening to occur immediately, near at
hand, and impending . . . . [Defendants] cite long-range risks
and dangers that do not presently threaten health and safety.
Where the hazards are long term, the danger is not imminent,
because the defendants have time to exercise options other than
breaking the law.
74. Id.
75. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 50 (1972).




[T]he spectre of nuclear accident [does not] fulfill the im-
minent and compelling harm element of the defense . . . . [The
defendants] claimed that they acted to foreclose the "chance" or
"possibility" of accident. This defense cannot lightly be allowed
to justify acts taken to foreclose speculative and uncertain
dangers
These acts may be a method of making public statements
about nuclear power and its dangers, but they are not a legal
basis for invoking the defense of necessity.7
The concurring opinion joins the majority in providing explicit
recognition in Vermont of the defense of necessity in the criminal
law. 80 The concurring opinion then proceeds to refer to the defense
not as a choice of "two evils" but, rather, as a selection between
competing values. As Justice Hill declared in his concurring opinion:
there are circumstances where the value protected by the law is
eclipsed by a superseding value . . . . The balancing of compet-
ing values cannot, of course, be committed to the private judg-
ment of the actor, but must, in most cases, be determined at
trial with due regard being given for the crime charged and the
higher value sought to be achieved.
Determination of the issue of competing values and, there-
fore, the availability of the defense of necessity is precluded,
however, when there has been a deliberate legislative choice as
to the values at issue. The common law defense of necessity
deals with imminent dangers from obvious and generally recog-
nized harms. It does not deal with non-imminent or debatable
harms, nor does it deal with activities that the legislative branch
has expressly sanctioned and found not to be harms.
Both the State of Vermont and the federal government
have given their imprimatur to the development and normal op-
eration of nuclear energy . . . . Implicit within these statutory
enactments is the policy choice that the benefits of nuclear en-
ergy outweigh its dangers.
If we were to allow defendants to present the necessity de-
fense in this case we would, in effect, be allowing a jury to rede-
termine questions of policy already decided by the legislative
branches of the federal and state governments. This is not how
our system of government was meant to operate.
[T]he majority puts the cart before the horse. It measures
the offer made against the requisite elements of the defense
79. Id. at 25-26, 410 A.2d at 1002.
80. Id. at 26, 410 A.2d at 1003.
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. . . . It is illogical to consider whether the necessary elements
of a defense have been shown before determining whether the
defense is even available in the particular situation."'
It was on this basis that Justice Hill concluded that the trial court
did not err in precluding the presentation of the defense of necessity.
Justice Billings, the sole dissenter, took the view that the trial
court should have permitted the evidence to be heard by the jury.
Justice Billings reasoned that it was not for the trial judge to rule on
the ultimate credibility and weight of the evidence, nor was it for the
Supreme Court to weigh the credibility of the evidence when evi-
dence had been offered in support of the elements of the defense.8 2
The dissent asserted that even though nuclear energy had been ap-
proved by the state and federal governments by enactment of a regu-
latory scheme, the defendants should have been permitted to show
that the specific Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant failed to com-
ply with the regulatory scheme."3 It must be conceded that while the
evidence proffered by the defendants echoed the general danger of
nuclear power, they also offered to show the specific and imminent
danger of the Vermont Yankee facility.
2. State v. Dorsey."4-In this case, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court ruled that a nuclear power plant protest trespasser was
precluded from presentation of the common law defense of necessity.
In addition, the court ruled that he could not rely upon the compet-
ing harms defense that had been enacted in New Hampshire by
statute.
The statute creating the competing harms defense, which the
Supreme Court acknowledged to be a mirror of the common law de-
fense of necessity, decreed:
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid harm
to himself or another is justifiable if the desirability and urgency
of avoiding such harm outweigh, according to ordinary stan-
dards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense charged .... 85
The court noted that the New Hampshire statute" was largely based
upon the New York justification statute and what the court charac-
81. Id. at 27-28, 410 A.2d at 1003-1004 (citations omitted throughout).
82. Id. at 29-30, 410 A.2d at 1005.
83. Id. at 30, 410 A.2d at 1005.
84. 118 N.H. 844, 395 A.2d 855 (1978).
85. Id. at 845, 395 A.2d at 856.
86. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 I (1974).
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terized as the Model Penal Code "choice of evils" doctrine. 87
The New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized that, consis-
tent with the comment to Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code, the
defense is only available if the issue of competing values has not
been foreclosed by deliberate legislative choice.88 Since the legisla-
ture of the State of New Hampshire and the Congress of the United
States have made deliberate choices in favor of the use of nuclear
power, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned "it is incon-
ceivable that the legislature would intend that nuclear power be con-
sidered such a harm as to justify individuals in breaking the law. We
are confident that it was not intended that such matters be included
within the scope of [the competing harm statute]." 89
The court further ruled that the common law defense of neces-
sity was also unavailable to the defendant. The court stated that the
common law defense dealt with imminent dangers from generally
recognized harms and did not deal with 1) non-imminent or debata-
ble harms or 2) activities that the legislative branch of government
had expressly sanctioned.90
3. Commonwealth v. Averill.91-The Appeals Court of Massa-
chusetts in Averill reviewed the conviction of defendants who had
been found guilty of trespass when they refused the admonition of
plant representatives and police to leave the private park of a nuclear
power plant complex. The message urged by the defendants in their
protest described the hazards to health and life of nuclear generating
facilities. None of the defendants, however, displayed in their testi-
mony an expectation that their trespass would have an immediate
consequence in reducing the danger apprehended.92 The court ruled,
therefore, that an essential element of the justification defense of ne-
87. State v. Dorsey, 118 N.H. at 846, 395 A.2d at 856-57.
88. Id. at 846, 395 A.2d at 857.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court, as though musing, re-echoed what a study of justification decisions
reveals is really a judicial chant concerning the wisdom of justification statutes:
To allow nuclear power plants to be considered a danger or harm within the
meaning of that defense either at common law or under the statute would re-
quire lay jurors to determine in individual cases matters of state and national
policy in a very technical field. Competing factions would produce extensive ex-
pert testimony on the danger or lack of danger of nuclear power plants, and
jurors in each case would then be asked to decide issues already determined by
the legislature. The competing harm statute [and the common law doctrine of
necessity are] intended to deal only with harms that are readily apparent and
recognizable to the average juror.
Id. at 846-47, 395 A.2d at 857.
91. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 423 N.E.2d 6 (1981).
92. Averill, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 261, 423 N.E.2d at 7.
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cessity was missing, namely, that the actor reasonably anticipate a
direct causal relationship between his act and the avoidance of
harm.93 The court further cited the New Hampshire decision dis-
cussed above, State v. Dorsey,94 for the ruling that the common law
defense of necessity deals with obvious and generally recognized
harms, not with harms which are debatable and, indeed, have been
the subject of legislative and government regulation.95
4. Commonwealth v. Brugmann.9 6-The defense of competing
harms, based upon the Model Penal Code defense of necessity, had
been recommended for adoption in the Proposed Criminal Code of
Massachusetts, but had not yet been enacted at the time of the deci-
sion in the instant case. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, how-
ever, applied the notion of competing harms after concluding that it
had long been recognized in Massachusetts. 97 The court distin-
guished this prosecution of nuclear protest trespassers from its deci-
sion nine months earlier by noting that in Averill the court dealt
with an informational protest on the general dangers of nuclear
power, whereas "here we deal with a protest directed at bringing an
immediate end to what was, in the opinion of the defendants' ex-
perts, an emergency situation. 98 After reciting a list of authorities,
the court concluded that the defense of competing harms was only
available in the following circumstances:
(1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant can
reasonably expect that his action will be effective as the direct
cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal alternative
which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the legisla-
ture has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and delib-
erate choice regarding the values at issue.9"
Before proceeding to an application of these principles to the
facts of the prosecution, however, the court recited the proper proce-
dure for the presentation of the defense:
[1] The question of necessity [or of justification or of competing
harms] is fairly raised "only if there is evidence that would war-
93. id.
94. 118 N.H. 844, 395 A.2d 855 (1978).
95. Averill, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at __, 423 N.E.2d at 8.
96. 13 Mass. App. Ct. 373, 433 N.E.2d 457 (1982).
97. Id. at -, 433 N.E.2d at 460.
98. Id. at , 433 N.E.2d at 461.
99. Id.
JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE
rant a reasonable doubt whether the [act in question] was justi-
fied" as a choice between evils. [2] If the question is properly
raised, the Commonwealth then has the burden to prove the ab-
sence of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. [3] The de-
fendant, however, has the initial burden of producing evidence
sufficient to raise the issue.' 00
The posture of the appeal apparently caused the court to con-
clude that "the evidence appears to satisfy the first two elements,"' 01
but the court nonetheless ruled that the defense was unavailable.
The defendants had failed to sufficiently demonstrate the existence
of the third element. 0 That ruling made it unnecessary for the
court to consider the fourth element.
The Averill decision is valuable for its attempt to articulate the
justification defense. It sets forth the four elements that must coa-
lesce if the defense, whatever its guise, is to be available, and further
describes succinctly and precisely the procedures to be employed if
the defense is to be presented.
5. State v. Greene. 10 -In State v. Greene, the Kansas Court
of Appeals reviewed the trespass conviction of nuclear protestors in
light of the Kansas statute on the defense of "compulsion." That
statute provided:
A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary
manslaughter by reason of conduct which he performs under the
compulsion or the threat of the imminent infliction of death or
great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or great
bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or upon his spouse, par-
ent, child, brother or sister if he does not perform such
conduct.'
The Court of Appeals alluded to the issue of imminence, rejected the
defendants' argument due to the absurd consequences that the de-
fense of compulsion would here allow, and proceeded to a discussion
of State v. Dorsey,0 5 State v. Warshow'06 and United States v.
Best.'0 7 It then rejected the arguments of the defendants apparently
100. Id. at - , 433 N.E.2d at 462 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 5 Kan. App. 2d 698, 623 P.2d 933 (1981).
104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3209 (Vernon 1971).
105. 118 N.H. 844, 395 A.2d 855 (1978).
106. 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000 (1980).
107. 476 F. Supp. 34 (D.C. Colo. 1979).
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on the basis of these cases.'0 8
The Kansas Court of Appeals' decision echoed the reasoning of
the decisions discussed above - namely, that policy making is the
province of the legislature, not jurors. 09
6. United States v. Best. 10-The defendants in this federal
prosecution in Colorado were charged with criminal trespass as a
result of their unauthorized entry upon property subject to the juris-
diction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."' The court rejected
a number of pre-trial motions that had been filed by the defendants
and then entered upon a discussion of the subject of the justification
defense:
Using sundry approaches, defendants say that they were forced
to trespass because of some overpowering force which mandated
their violation of the criminal law. This argument has come
before the courts in all sizes, shapes, colors and descriptions, and
it has not fared well.
The Viet Nam War is the event whizh brought about the
recent decisions passing upon the availability of defenses such as
the defense of "necessity," "justification," "choice of evils," or
similar explanations in attempting to explain away criminal
act.
1 12
The district court thus granted the motion in limine of the pros-
ecution and ruled:
I repeat that these are criminal cases in which a jury will be
asked to decide whether the government has proven the charge
made beyond a reasonable doubt; i.e., the charge of criminal
trespass; and that is all any jury will pass on. There will be no
108. Greene, 5 Kan. App.2d at 701-02, 625 P.2d at 937.
109. Id. at 700, 623 P.2d at 936. The court stated:
The legislature has established a statutory scheme for the development and use
of nuclear power. If the compulsion defense were available to those individuals
who disagree with that policy, then jurors in cases like this would have to decide
on a case-by-case basis whether the defendants' beliefs in a potential harm were
reasonable. That result would transfer from the legislature to random groups of
citizens the task of weighing nuclear power against its potential for harm. Yet
the legislature, as noted, has already spoken. We are not concerned with the
wisdom of the present legislative policy on the subject; we do conclude that such
a policy decision is for the people's elected representatives and not for jurors in
individual cases.
Id.
110. 476 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1979).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 42.
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jury trial as to the morality or immorality of nuclear weapons or
nuclear power. There will be no jury trial as to the wisdom or
lack of wisdom of continuing any part of the nuclear program in
this country. No jury will decide on the correctness vel non of
any acts of Congress or the executive branch of the government.
These are not decisions to be made by either judge or jury.
There will be no jury trial involving the good or bad motives of
any defendant. No jury will be asked to decide any political
question, nor will a jury pass on the relevance or materiality of
any defense."
3
Chief Judge Winner then discussed several decisions which he
viewed as providing sage, insight and counsel, and quoted extensively
from U.S. v. Moylan,"' and State v. Marley."
5
Colorado had enacted a statute" 6 that reflected the procedure
that had been adopted by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in
Commonwealth v. Brugmann.117 The district judge stated that while
the statute had no application to a federal trial, the judge felt it
relevant that the Colorado legislature would not permit the defense
of necessity to rest solely on considerations of morality."' The legis-
lature had directed that the defense could not be presented unless
the court first ruled as a matter of law that the facts and circum-
stances would, if established, constitute justification. 1 9
The district judge then specified the prerequisites which an offer
of proof in support of the defense of justification would have to meet
before it would be admissible. " The itemized prerequisites resem-
bled those expressed in several cases reviewed earlier; it also estab-
lished a further, quite fundamental and strict requirement. The act
to be prevented by the conduct of the defendant had to be criminal
under the law. The court then decreed:
[A]bsent . . . the full preliminary proof required . . . there is
113. Id. at 41.
114. 417 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1969).
115. 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
116. COLo. Rcv. STAT. § 18-1-702(2) (1973).
The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (I) of this section
shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisabil-
ity of the statute . . . . When evidence relating to the defense of justification
under this section is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the
consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law whether the
claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.
Id.
117. 13 Mass. App. Ct. 373, 433 N.E.2d 457 (1982).
118. United States v. Best, 476 F. Supp. 34, 47 (D. Colo. 1979).
119. See supra note 116.
120. Best, 476 F. Supp. at 48.
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no room in these cases for a justification defense of any sort, be
it a choice of evils, necessity or something similar masquerading
under another name. Unless there be an appropriate offer of
proof, there will be no jury voir dire, there will be no opening
statement, there will be no testimony, there will be no instruc-
tions and there will be no final argument as to a justification
defense.'21
The court concluded with the observation that the other active
judges of the district court had reviewed the opinion and agreed to
apply the ground rules therein pronounced.
22
C. Pro-Life Protests
The 1973 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade12 3 inspired widespread outrage from a significant portion of
the populace across the country. The public protests were, for the
first few years, essentially unorganized and sporadic. The trespass
protests have for the most part been conducted by the anti-abortion
advocates and not their adversaries, and the shift in their designation
from anti-abortion to pro-life groups has only enhanced their fervor.
While the national media has from time to time sensationalized the
prosecution of individuals for the bombing and destruction of abor-
tion facilities, the focus of our study is the pro-life protestor as a
non-violent trespasser.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 2 4 concluded that the right
or privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" during the first trimes-
ter.'25 As a result, abortions during the first trimester became legal
and abortion clinics became common operations, ostensibly, of
course, for the conduct of abortions only during the first trimester.
Since the pro-life protestor is the most recent demonstrator
upon the American scene, appellate decisions examining the availa-
bility of the defense of necessity are not nearly so numerous as are
appellate studies of anti-war protestors and anti-nuclear demonstra-
tors. Nor, by reason of the site of the demonstrations, has the pro-
life protestor received the attention of the federal courts. In any
event, one commentator advises that prosecutions have occurred in
121. Id. at 49.
122. Id.
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 153.
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thirty-seven states126 and that the great majority of courts consider-
ing the defense have rejected it as a matter of law, usually in the
form of a pre-trial ruling on admissibility of evidence.
1 7
The appellate decisions available for examination demonstrate
that the pro-life protestors generally conduct a sit-in at the abortion
clinic and are arrested and removed when they refuse to comply with
the direction to depart issued by representatives of the owners and
the authorities.
1. Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State.128-Sigma Re-
productive Health Center, operator of a health care service that pro-
vided first trimester abortions, was the scene of a demonstration by
protestors who were eventually arrested as well as charged and con-
victed of trespass in a summary proceeding. One individual, Debra
Braun, appealed, and in an effort to prepare for the trial de novo,
served upon Sigma Reproductive Health Center a subpoena duces
tecum seeking certain records of the Center so as to enable her to
present the defense of necessity. 129 Both the Center and the State of
Maryland argued that the accused could not assert the defense of
necessity on the facts of this case and sought to quash the subpoena.
The trial judge declined to address the issue of necessity and ordered
that the subpoena duces tecum be issued. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland ruled, for reasons of judicial economy, that the defense of
necessity was unavailable under the facts of this prosecution. 30
The court of appeals discussed the principles of the defense as
articulated by prominent authors and relied upon the opinion of the
Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Marley.1'3 The court went on to
discuss:
[the fnive cases [which] have dealt with the legitimacy df the
necessity defense against the charges of criminal trespass on
abortion clinics. All find the defense not to be a proper one.
126. See Necessity As a Defense To a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion
Clinic, 48 CINN. L. REV. 501 (1979). The accuracy of this count seems questionable since the
sole basis for the number is a personal letter from an individual identified only by name.
127. Id. at 501. The reliability of this statement may also be suspect since the author
supports the claim with a citation to but three trial court decisions, one each in Connecticut,
Minnesota and the District of Columbia, The author notes, however, that the defense was
relied upon successfully on two occasions in the same county in Virginia. That result caused
the county prosecutor to refrain from arresting such demonstrators and caused the targeted
medical center to obtain a permanent injunction from the federal court against the trespassers.
128. 297 Md. 660, 476 A.2d 483 (1983).
129. Id. at . 467 A.2d at 484.
130. Id. at -, 467 A.2d at 490.
131. 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973).
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Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073
(Alaska, 1981); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C.
1979); People v. Stiso, 93 llI.App.3rd 101, 48 III. Dec. 687, 416
N.E.2d 1209 (1981); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. at 3rd 288, 48 Ill.
Dec. 141, 416 N.E.2d 36 (1980); City of St. Louis v. Klocker,
637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. App. 1982).
The Maryland Court of Appeals then noted that the two divi-
sions of the Appellate Court of Illinois which decided Krizka and
Stiso, as well as the Missouri Court of Appeals in Klocker, all relied
upon the following rationale to reject the defense:
The criminal conduct pursued by a defendant must be pursued
to avoid an imminent injury. The United States Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade recognized that a woman's decision to abort her
pregnancy [during the first trimester] is protected by her consti-
tutional right to privacy. Abortion during the first trimester is,
therefore, a constitutionally protected activity and its occurrence
cannot be an injury. Since there was no legally recognized injury
to prevent, the trespass of defendants is not justified by reason of
necessity. 132
The Alaska Supreme Court did not rely upon Roe v. Wade"'8
for the reason that the legislature of Alaska had resolved the issue of
whether abortion is a more significant evil than trespass by passage
of a statute which imposed only rudimentary restrictions upon abor-
tions. Thus, the purpose of the legislature of Alaska to exclude justi-
fication as a defense for trespass to prevent first trimester abortions
plainly appears.
The Gaetano decision of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, on the other hand, appears so intent on a recitation of the
"rights [which] . . . are a cornerstone of the American system" that
it did not pause to consider the protestors' challenge which other ap-





132. Sigma Reproduction Health Center, 299 Md. at -, 467 A.2d at 496-97.
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. App. 1979). Judge McCarr
of the Municipal Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota, provided an insightful response to the
argument of the abortion trespassers that Roe v. Wade should not be controlling since it did
not determine the issue of viability:
Judges of trial courts are duty bound to follow the Constitution as inter-
preted by the Nation's highest tribunal. The bottom line is that the United
States Supreme Court has held that first trimester abortions, which are what we
are here involved with, are lawful.
Defendants seek to avoid the impact of that ruling by arguing that Roe v.
Wade does not determine when life begins. The Defendants wish to introduce
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D. The Deprogrammer Cases
A number of young Americans fell prey to religious cults during
the decade of the 70's. Since the greater number of the devotees had
attained their majority, it was difficult for their anxious parents to
rely upon the judicial system for relief. As a result, parents turned to
"deprogrammers" who abducted the children from the cult and con-
fined them for several days of lectures and treatment. Their goal was
to convince them to reject the cult and return to their prior environ-
ment. As a result, the cults and their members sought legal protec-
tion in prosecution of the deprogrammers.
Deprogrammers prosecuted for kidnapping or false imprison-
ment have relied on the necessity defense, which has tradition-
ally exculpated defendants who violated a law to avoid a greater
evil than the law was designed to prevent. In deprogramming
cases, the defense has proceeded in two stages. Defendants ar-
gue first that the parents reasonably believed deprogramming
necessary to protect their child from physical and psychological
harm. Deprogrammers then claim that they, as the parents'
agents, should also benefit from the parents' defense because few
parents could protect their children without assistance. The
courts have split on the legitimacy of this defense.'
1. People v. Patrick.'36-In People v. Patrick, the defendant
was charged with kidnapping and related offenses. The record re-
flects that the defendant had been contacted by a group of parents
medical testimony to prove this point. They argue that although Roe v. Wade
may permit abortions during the first trimester, if such abortions in fact consti-
tute the taking of life, the Defendants' intervention to save these lives is justified
by the necessity doctrine.
It is true that the Court in Roe v. Wade expressly left open this question,
saying, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in man's knowl-
edge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." At least inferentially,
the majority opinion in Roe mandates that the woman's right of privacy is para-
mount to this right to life, even if it is found to exist during the first trimester of
pregnancy. While this Court finds such a pronouncement chilling, it is not with-
out precedent. The taking of a life of a convicted criminal - we call it capital
punishment - has repeatedly been held valid under constitutional standards.
Since the abortions performed at the Midwest Health Center on January 7,
1978 were all within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy and hence protected by
the United States Supreme Court mandate, the defense of necessity must fail.
State v. Rasmussen, 5 Fain. L. Reporter 2037-38 (Lu. Ct. Minn. 1979) (citations omitted).
135. Cults, Deprogranminers. and the Necessity Defense, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 271, 272
(1981).
136. 541 P.2d 320 (Col. App. 1975).
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who believed that their daughters were members of a "dangerous
religious cult" and, at a meeting with the parents, he agreed to
"deprogram" the women.13 7 The defendant had assisted the fathers
of the two girls to gain access and control of the vehicle of their
daughters and drive the girls, one aged twenty-one and the other
aged twenty-three, away without their consent. The girls were then
detained for two days during which the defendant undertook his
deprogramming procedure.
138
The defendant asserted that the trial court had erred in refusing
to provide an instruction on the "choice of evils" defense which, as
has been shown, was established in Colorado by statute.18 9 The court
ruled, however, that the defense was not available. There was no evi-
dence that an imminent public or private injury was about to occur
which would require emergency action. 40
2. United States v. Patrick.'-Mr. Patrick had better luck,
however, in this federal prosecution for kidnapping. He had been
employed by the parents of a nineteen year old California girl to
abduct her in the State of Washington and forcibly remove her to
California in order to "deprogram" her. The defendant admitted
that all of the elements of the offense charged were present and that
he had engaged in the conduct attributed to him. 2 He claimed,
however, the defense of necessity as defined by the Model Penal
Code.
43
The trial of the case was conducted on a case stated basis since:
[I]f the trial judge ruled that the defense of necessity was not
available, there would be no case left to try because the defend-
ant conceded the act and a finding of guilt could be entered,
thus enabling the defendant to present the issue to the Circuit
Court . . . .[I]f the court ruled that the defense was not availa-
ble there would be no case left to try because Patrick conceded
the act and a finding of guilt could be entered, thus enabling
Patrick to present the issue to [the appellate court]. On the
other hand, [counsel for the government] said, if the court rules
that the mere belief of danger is a defense, then there is no liti-
gable issue for the United States would concede and stipulate
137. Id. at 321.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
140. Patrick, 541 P.2d at 322.
141. 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976).
142. Id. at 144.
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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that the victim's parents believed her to be in some sort of dan-
ger. Under those circumstances the finding of "not guilty"
would be entered. 4
4
The trial judge concluded that the availability of the defense turned
upon the parents' reasonable cause to believe, as well as their actual
belief, that their child was in imminent danger; and where the par-
ents were of the reasonable and intelligent belief that they alone
were not physically capable of recapturing their daughter from ex-
isting, imminent danger, then the defense of necessity could be
transferred to their constiituted agent.
145
The trial judge adjudged the defendant not guilty. The govern-
ment appealed but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal upon double jeopardy grounds. As a result, the question of
whether the defense of necessity had been properly raised was left
unanswered.146
E. The Laetrile Decision
1. United States v. Richardson.'4 -The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the conviction of the de-
fendants for conspiracy to smuggle laetrile into this country in
United States v. Richardson.'8 Appellants contended that since lae-
trile, when declared at the border, was regularly seized by customs
officials, it could not be brought into the country unless smuggled,
and since laetrile was needed in the United States to treat cancer
patients, the defense of necessity or "choice of evils," traditionally a
branch of the common law doctrine of justification, was
applicable.1
49
The circuit court rejected the argument, stating:
144. Patrick, 532 F.2d at 144.
145. Id. at 145.
146. Patrick has been acquitted twice in New York. Brown, Memorandum on Ted Pat-
rick and Religious Cults, in DEPROGRAMMING: DOCUMENTING THE ISSUE at 38 (copy on file
with the Michigan Law Review). Patrick was also acquitted in Washington. United States v.
Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976). Patrick was convicted of false imprisonment in Colo-
rado, in People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320 (Col. App. 1975), and was convicted along with the
cult member's parents, of misdemeanor kidnapping, in Orange County, California. See Indi-
vidual Freedom Foundation Newsletter, reprinted in DEPROGRAMMING: DOCUMENTING THE
ISSUE, supra at 134. Most recently. Patrick was convicted in San Diego, California, of conspir-
acy, false imprisonment, and kidnapping. This was the first time that Patrick was convicted of
a felony. See People v. Patrick, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30th, 1980, at 7, col. I (San Diego Super.
Ct. Aug. 29. 1980)." ('uilts, Deprograninters. and the Necessity Defense, supra note 135, at
273 n. 15.
147. 588 F.2d 1235 (1978).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1239.
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The defense of necessity . . . is hedged about with many condi-
tions, at least one of which would prevent its application here:
"(T)he assertion of the necessity defense requires that optional
courses of action appear unavailable."
Here the obvious optional course of action was to take steps
to render the "necessary" action legal - to pursue the course
[of] seeking to have the FDA classification of Laetrile set aside
or to have it approved as a new drug. If it was felt that classifi-
cation as a new drug does not justify seizure of Laetrile declared
at the border, the seizure could have been legally challenged.
Also, as the government suggests, another alternative was the
production of Laetrile in the United States.1 50
The decision of the circuit court was consistent with earlier de-
cisions of the circuit court which had affirmed convictions for smug-
gling laetrile. The report of this appellate decision does not reveal
whether the defendants were individuals who brought the laetrile
into the country in an amount necessary for the treatment of a fam-
ily member or were individuals who intended to sell the drug. The
court could appropriately admonish the latter type of individual that
the act of smuggling was not "necessary" since the course of FDA
reclassification was available. If the accused smuggler had brought
the medication into the country in order to aid a suffering loved one,
however, the admonition approaches absurdity and resembles the re-
sponse of a bishop to the suffering hungry that they should seek re-
lief in prayer.
VI. The Protestor and Justification in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania appellate courts have in this decade thor-
oughly examined and discussed the availability to the protestor of
the defense of justification. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
by its decisions in two controversial cases, has in recent months es-
tablished with certainty the prerequisites that attend its use.
A. The Statutes
When a new Criminal Code became effective in Pennsylvania in
June 1973, it provided: "In any prosecution based on conduct which
is justifiable under this chapter, justification is a defense."' ' 51 The
very next section of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code represents the
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon 1983).
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enactment of Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code in Pennsylvania
with but insignificant differences in the bold face introduction of the
provisions and the omission of one conjunction:
§ 503. Justification generally
(a) General rule. - Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
justifiable if:
(I) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged;
(2) neither this title nor other law defining the of-
fense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved; and
(3) the justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.
(b) Choice of evils. - When the actor was reckless or neg-
ligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of
harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the
justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecu-
tion for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the
case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 52
As for the initial prerequisite in Section 503 that the actor "be-
lieves" his conduct to be necessary, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
Section 501, defines "believes" as "reasonably believes."153 In this
regard, then, the Pennsylvania statute specifically declares what the
Model Penal Code only implies.
The Pennsylvania justification statute further mirrors the Model
Penal Code in Section 510 which is an exact enactment of Section
3.10 of the Model Penal Code. The provisions of this section of the
Model Penal Code have not earlier been mentioned but will be dis-
cussed here because Section 510 stirred considerable interest during
the discussion of these cases by the Pennsylvania appellate courts.
Section 510 of the Pennsylvania act provides:
§ 510. Justification in property crimes.
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction
of, damage to, intrusion on or interference with property is justi-
fiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of
privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:
(I) this title or the law defining the offense deals with the
152. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1983).
153. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon 1983).
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specific situation involved; or
(2) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
otherwise plainly appears.15'
B. The Facts
On July 15, 1979, the Shippingsport Nuclear Power Plant had
been closed and was scheduled to resume operations in two weeks.
Patricia Ann Capitolo and five companions, participating in a protest
against the generation of nuclear power at the plant, ignored a "No
Trespass" sign, crept under a fence enclosing the property and sat
down, holding hands, about ten to twelve feet inside the fence. When
the defendants ignored the direction of plant representatives and a
deputy sheriff to leave the premises because they were trespassers,
they were placed under arrest. Neither personal injury nor property
damage occurred during their occupation of the property and they
did not resist removal by the officers. The defendants sought to pre-
sent the defense of justification but the trial court rejected that ef-
fort, and expressed the belief that even if defendants had been per-
mitted to present their evidence, they would not have been able to
prove that their trespass was justified. The five were tried and con-
victed of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver
County.
155
On September 9, 1981, the Berrigan brothers, Phillip and
Daniel, and six associates entered the General Electric plant in King
of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where they used hammers to damage hy-
drogen bomb missile components under manufacture for the United
States government. 156 They also poured human blood on the prem-
ises. No personal injuries occurred as a result of the incident; the
amount of property damages exceeded $28,000.'1 The defendants
were arrested and convicted of burglary,158 criminal mischief and
criminal conspiracy. The defendants in this case also sought to pre-
sent the defense of justification. The defendants did not deny their
participation in the occurrence but sought to justify their conduct
through application of the principles of justification. The trial court
154. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510 (Purdon 1983).
155. Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. 61, 471 A.2d 462, rev'd, - Pa.
- , 498 A.2d 806 (1985).
156. "[A]nd they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning
hooks; nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore."
Isaiah 2:4.
157. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. 242, 249, 472 A.2d 1099, 1102, rev'd,
- Pa...., 501 A.2d 226 (1985).
158. Id.
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permitted the defendants to raise the defense and to offer their own
testimony in support of the defense, but refused to permit them to
present expert testimony in support of the defense."
The defendants in both cases undertook appeals to the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court. Seven judges of that fifteen member Court
heard both appeals on May 10, 1983, and, in early 1984, by a 4-3
vote in each instance, ruled that not only should the defendants have
been able to present the defense but that, in addition, they should
have been able to present expert testimony in support of the de-
fense.160 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, during the fall of 1985,
and in no uncertain terms, reversed the Superior Court in each case
and reinstated the convictions of all the defendants.
6
C. The View of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, an Intermediate
Appellate Court
The Superior Court decision in Capitolo was filed in January,
1984, and preceded its Berrigan ruling by one month. As we have
noted, the decision in each case was by a bare majority 4-3 vote.
1. The Majority in Capitolo.-The defendants in Capitolo
sought to present the defense of justification and presented to the
trial court an offer of proof composed of two parts. First, the defend-
ants sought to establish the basis for their "reasonable beliefs that
their conduct was necessary to avoid the harm,"' 62 by presenting tes-
timony and documents to demonstrate: (1) that extensive efforts had
been earlier undertaken to eliminate the dangers emanating from the
nuclear plant and/or to close the plant; (2) that those earlier efforts
had been unsuccessful; (3) that even though official channels with
authority to remove the danger would appear to be available, the
possibility that those channels would decide to remove the danger
was but theoretical and any approach to those channels would be
futile; and (4) since the construction of a nuclear facility in another
state was halted after the arrest of a number of demonstrators, there
was a nexus between their trespass and the harm sought to be
avoided. 6 '
Second, the defendants offered to prove that the harm emanat-
159. Id.
160. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. at 82, 471 A.2d at 481; Berrigan 325 Pa. Super. at 258,
472 A.2d at 1114.
161. Capitolo, - Pa. ., 498 A.2d 806; Berrigan, - Pa. ., 501 A.2d 226.
162. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. at 69, 471 A.2d at 464.
163. Id.
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ing from the Shippingsport plant was "far greater than any harm
resulting from their trespass"16 by evidence demonstrating: (1) the
actual risk of serious accident at the Shippingsport plant and the
actual consequences of such an accident far exceeded indications in
official studies; and (2) that expert testimony and documentation
would demonstrate that the Shippingsport plant actually and contin-
uously released low level radiation that had already caused increased
infant mortality, birth defects and cancer in adults. 165 The trial court
rejected the offer of proof insofar as the defendants sought to present
expert testimony and documentation, and limited the evidence of the
defendants to the expression in their own testimony of their reasons
for committing the trespass. 66
As we have seen, the Pennsylvania statute requires that the "be-
lief" of the actor be a reasonable belief that his conduct is necessary
to avoid a greater harm. The majority of the Superior Court con-
cluded that while the trial court permitted the defendants to testify
as to their "belief," the ruling of the trial court that the defendants
could not present further evidence through documents and expert
testimony as to the nature of the danger had precluded the defend-
ants from proving that their belief was reasonable.6 7 The majority
was satisfied to have the trial judge preclude the presentation of the
defense of necessity when the question of values presented was frivo-
lous or bizarre, but concluded that the values asserted by the defend-
ants were neither. 66
The majority also rejected the decision of the trial court that
the evidence was inadmissible because the defendants had been
".reckless or negligent . . . in appraising the necessity"' 69 for their
actions because such non-criminal alternatives as agency proceedings
were available to avoid the dangers feared by the defendants. Since
the offer of proof included evidence that further efforts by the de-
fendants to secure relief through regulatory agencies would be futile,
the majority found this ruling of the trial court to be without basis
and, thus, error.
70
The defendants had also offered to prove that an extensive effort
to secure relief from regulatory agencies had been undertaken with-
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 71, 471 A.2d at 467.
167. Id. at 72-73, 471 A.2d at 467-68.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 74, 471 A.2d at 469.
170. Id. at 77, 471 A.2d at 470.
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out success and that, therefore, any future effort would be futile. 71
The trial court ruling was equivalent to a direction that the defend-
ants must nonetheless trod the endless paths of bureaucracy. Some
would observe that the denial to protestors of the defense of justifica-
tion upon this ground is vacuous for, while it is true that in the pre-
sent age you can fight city hall, even city hall avoids proceeding
through the interminable morass of bureaucracy. Since this proposi-
tion appears little more than makeweight, the courts, whether appel-
late or trial, are well advised to rely upon other bases for rejection of
the defense of justification.
The majority in its decision pronounced four precepts. The ini-
tial ruling was that the jury should have been allowed to appraise
the evidence that was the subject of the offer of proof.172 The second
ruling was of basic importance to this discussion since it declared
that Section 503 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code - the mirror of
Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code - requires: (1) that the de-
fendants reasonably believe their conduct to be necessary to avoid a
harm; and (2) that the harm sought to be avoided be greater than
the harm occasioned by the conduct of the defendants. 17 The major-
ity, after noting that the common law is by no means clear, declared
that two other precepts which numerous appellate decisions have es-
tablished as common law requirements of the defense of necessity
are not prerequisites to the establishment of the statutory defense.
Unlike at common law, under the Pennsylvania statute, the defend-
ants need not show the harm to be avoided is imminent, or that there
is a direct causal relationship or nexus between their conduct and the
avoidance of the greater harm. 7 4 The majority did not address, how-
ever, the view that the term "necessary to avoid" is the basis for the
prerequisites of "imminence" and "nexus."
The third pronouncement of the Superior Court majority also
touches the essence of this study since it carefully scrutinizes subsec-
tions (a)(2) and (a)(3) of Section 503 of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code and thereby subsections 1(b) and I(c) of Section 3.02 of the
Model Penal Code. The ruling may best be described by quoting it:
Section 503(a)(3) specifies still another requirement that
must be satisfied, if justification is to be proved: "a legislative
purpose to exclude the justification does not otherwise plainly
171. Id. at 69, 471 A.2d at 464.
172. Id. at 78, 471 A.2d at 470.
173. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1983).
174. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1983).
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1986
appear." The question that arises in construing this requirement
is, What does "otherwise" mean? When Section 503(a)(3) is
construed with Section 503(a)(2), the answer to this question is
clear.
Together, Sections 503(a)(2) and (a)(3) provide four ways
by which one may find a legislative purpose to preclude the de-
fense of justification. First, the Crimes Code may provide "ex-
ceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved."
Second, some "other law defining the offense" may provide such
exceptions or defenses. Third, if no such exceptions or defenses
appear in the Crimes Code, a legislative purpose to preclude the
defense of justifiaction may nevertheless "otherwise plainly ap-
pear" in the Code. And fourth, if no such exceptions or defenses
appear in some "other law defining the offense," a legislative
purpose to preclude the defense of justification may nevertheless
"otherwise plainly appear" in such other law. In other words:
the defense of justification is precluded only if a legislative pur-
pose to preclude it is found in the criminal statute itself.17 5
The Superior Court majority opined that when Section
503(a)(3) is considered together with Section 503(a)(2), as indeed it
must be, it is clear that the legislative purpose must be found in the
Criminal Code itself. This rejects the view that a legislative purpose
to preclude the defense of justification may be found in other stat-
utes enacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly or by the
United States Congress. The majority cites two reasons for its
conclusion:
[T]he principle that whenever one section of a statute - here
Section 503(a)(3) - is read, it must be read, not by itself, but
with reference to, and in light of, other sections - here Section
503(a)(2). The principle that, as part of a penal statute, the
phrase "otherwise plainly appear" must be narrowly construed
in favor of the accused.1
76
The majority does not refute the suggestions that the statute is
hardly penal in nature since it is designed to assist an accused, and
that while one portion of a statute must be read in reference to other
portions whenever ambiguity appears, Section 503(a)(3) is hardly
ambiguous. The majority proceeded, in any event, to the conclusion
that its study of the Pennsylvania Atomic Energy Development and
Radiation Control Act 7 ' and of the United States Atomic Energy
175. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. at 79-82, 471 A.2d at 471 (1984).
176. Id. at 87-88, 471 A.2d at 475-76.
177. The Atomic Energy Development and Radiation Control Act, Act of January 28,
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Act 178 did not reveal any provision that could be considered to have
preempted or superseded the exercise of the "historic police powers"
represented by Section 503(a).1
7
1
Fourth and finally, the majority proceeded to a sua sponte dis-
cussion of Section 510 of the Pennsylvania statute, and again
thereby Section 3.10 of the Model Penal Code, even though the de-
fendants had offered no claim of defense under that section. As the
opinion notes, "Section 510 is necessarily implicated in this case,
where appellants' conduct was '[c]onduct involving . . . intrusion on
• . . property.' "180 The majority ruled that the defense of justifica-
tion under this section had not been preempted by federal or state
legislation any more than the defense had been preempted under
Section 503, thus leaving but the single question: Had the conduct
occurred under "circumstances which would establish a defense of
privilege in a civil action?"'' The Superior Court majority resolved
the issue of the applicability of Section 196 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts' 8 2 to Section 510 of the Crimes Code by concluding
that the present and continuing harms alleged in the offer of proof of
the defendants made it unnecessary to decide if the "imminence"
requirement of Section 196 of the Restatement must be imposed
upon Section 510 of the Pennsylvania statute. 8 3 The Superior Court
further ruled that the civil law privilege made available by Section
196 would not have been denied the defendants by reason of their
liability for harm done, since the prosecution had not claimed the
defendants had caused any damage to the property of the plaintiff by
their trespass.' 8 '
The majority thus concluded that the defendants' offer of proof
met the even more exacting requirements of Section 510, as well as
Section 503. Therefore, they should have been able to present the
evidence that composed their offer of proof to the jury in support of
the defense of justification under Section 510 as well as under Sec-
1966, P.L. 1625, Art. I, § I et seq., 73 P.S. 1001-1501, repealed by Act of July 10, 1984, P.L.
688, No. 147, § 702, replaced by Radiation Protection Act, Act of July 10, 1984, P.L. 688,
No. 147, § 101, 35 P.S. § 7110.101 el seq. (Purdon Supp. 1986).
178. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1966).
179. Capitolo, at 89, 471 A.2d at 476.
180. Capitolo. at 95, 471 A.2d at 479.
181. Id.
182. "One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor
reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disas-
ter." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).
183. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. at 96-97, 471 A.2d at 480.
184. Id. at 98, 471 A.2d at 481.
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tion 503.185
2. The Dissent in Capitolo.-The dissent in Capitolo, written
by Judge Johnson of the Superior Court and joined by Judges Hester
and Wieand, is a study in procedural analysis. The dissent first came
to the conclusion that a defendant, before he presents evidence to a
jury for determination of the matters of fact in relation to a justifica-
tion defense, must satisfy the court, as a matter of law, that he could
believe that his conduct was "necessary" to avoid the greater
threatened harm.186 From this point, the dissent went on to discuss
the necessity of an inference that the conduct in question would ei-
ther directly avoid or alleviate the impending harm. The defendant
must have reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship or
nexus between his criminal conduct and the contemporaneous avoid-
ance of the perceived harm.' s7 The dissent pointed out that the pro-
ceedings in the trial court, including the offer of proof, provided no
indication that the criminal trespass could or would directly result in
the immediate and contemporaneous stoppage of the emanation of
low level radiation or the immediate elimination of the alleged immi-
nent threat.
The dissenting judges then addressed the assertion of the major-
ity that there was no prerequisite that a defendant pleading justifica-
tion prove a direct causal relationship between the actor's conduct
and the avoidance of anticipated harm. The dissent urged that the
term "avoid" in the statute imposed just such a requirement, and
expressed concern that the interpretation of the majority would
render that term meaningless.18 8 Further, the majority's discussion
clearly ignored vital concerns:
What [is] missing in the majority's analysis is any guidance as
to how the jury's conclusion as to the existence of a reasonable
belief as to a continuing risk of a catastrophic accident is in any
way helpful in deciding whether specific conduct is necessary to
avoid a greater harm. If the advancement of a theory of jury
nullification were the issue . . . then . . . the jury should be
permitted to compare a . . . "harmless trespass" . . . against
. . . the continuing infliction by low level radiation of grave
injuries. 89
185. Id.
186. Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. 61, 106, 471 A.2d 462, 485 (1984)
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 108, 471 A.2d 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 109-10, 471 A.2d at 487 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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The dissent ended its analysis of the majority opinion with a discus-
sion of the majority's assertion that the testimony of the defendants
revealed their conduct to have been civil disobedience, and an enu-
meration of the practical reasons for a court to determine as a mat-
ter of law whether there is a "rational connection between the spe-
cific conduct and the avoidance of the identified harm" 190 before
permitting a jury to embark upon the determination of whether a
belief as to a particular harm is reasonable.
3. The Majority in Berrigan.-As has been noted, the same
seven member en banc session of the Superior Court which heard
presentation of oral argument in Capitolo, heard on the same date
the presentation of oral argument in Berrigan. The same four mem-
bers who prevailed in Capitolo again composed the majority in Ber-
rigan, while the same three members of the court joined in the
dissent.
The majority view in Berrigan is an echo of the thoughts and
conclusions of the majority in Capitolo. This is understandable be-
cause, even though the Berrigan appeal presents the additional fac-
tors of burglary and of damage to property, it is protest that inspires
defendants in both cases and it is the defense of justification that
both sets of defendants claimed.
The Berrigan dissent, authored by Judge Wieand and expres-
sing the view of three of the seven judges, states at the outset that
evidence of the spectre of nuclear warfare is only legally relevant if
it is logically relevant, that is, if it has probative value. Such evi-
dence as defendants sought to present was probative only if the de-
fendants were entitled to raise justification as a defense. They were
not, however, so entitled. Section 503(a) of the Pennsylvania justifi-
cation statute creates the general defense of justification but the de-
fendants were charged with property crimes and therefore must rely
upon Section 510, the specific rule which pertains to property crimes.
Furthermore, as shown earlier, Section 510 requires consideration of
the Restatement of Torts, and that rule of law imposes upon Section
510 the requirements that the actor reasonably believe the act in
question is necessary to avert an imminent and public disaster.
Lastly, the offer of proof presented by defendants did not include
evidence of an emergency at the General Electric plant that would
have required a trespass at the plant and the destruction of missile
components. It was held to be unreasonable, as a matter of law, to
190. Capitolo, at 110, 471 A.2d at 487 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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believe that destruction of "one of several components being sepa-
rately made for incorporation into future nuclear missiles" would
avert a nuclear war.1 91
The dissent provided extensive discussion in support of its con-
clusion that there has been such ample and abundant demonstration
by the United States Congress of the need for the development of
nuclear weaponry for the purpose of our national defense that the
"legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed" under Sec-
tion 510(2) "plainly appeared." The dissent, in apparent response to
the Berrigan majority, but also in response to Capitolo, emphasized
that the Comment to Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code 92 made
clear beyond question the fact that the legislative purpose need not
plainly appear in the criminal code. The legislative purpose to ex-
clude the defense might have been otherwise demonstrated as, in
fact, the dissent asserted was done in the Berrigan case. The dissent
concluded with the benchmark declaration of the Vermont Supreme
Court in State v. Warshow:193
Determination of the issue of competing values and, therefore,
the availability of the defense of necessity is precluded, however,
when there has been a deliberate legislative choice as to the val-
ues at issue.194
D. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. Commonwealth v. Capitolo.'95-It would seem that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the several opinions of
the intermediate appellate court in Capitolo and Berrigan had so
carefully analyzed, so thoroughly scrutinized, and so exhaustively
addressed the Pennsylvania justification statute that it need only pro-
191. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. 242, 286, 472 A.2d 1099, 1121 (1984) (Wieand, J.,
dissenting).
192. The comment to § 302 of the Model Penal Code provides:
This section accepts the view that a principle of necessity affords a general justi-
fication for conduct that otherwise would constitute an offense .... The princi-
ple is subject to [certain] vital limitations: (a) . . . . what is involved may be
described as an interpretation of the law of the offense, in light of the submission
that the special situation calls for an exception to the prohibition that the legisla-
ture could not reasonably have intended to exclude, given the competing values
to be weighed.(b) The issue of competing values must not have been foreclosed
by a deliberate legislative choice, as when the law has dealt explicitly with the
specific situation that presents the choice of evils . ...
MODEI. PENAL. CODE § 302 comment at 5 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
193. 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000.
194. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. at 291-92, 472 A.2d at 1124 (quoting
from State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, -_, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1979) (Hill, J., concurring)).
195. - Pa. -_, 498 A.2d 806 (1985).
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vide a succinct, clear ruling. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed the question rather precisely as it unanimously held: (1)
The defense of justification can be raised only in situations that deal
with harms or evils that are readily apparent and recognizable to
reasonable persons; (2) the defense cannot be permitted to justify
acts to foreclose speculative and uncertain dangers; (3) the defense is
available only for acts directed at the avoidance of harm that is rea-
sonably certain to occur; (4) the actor must reasonably believe that
the conduct chosen was necessary to avoid the greater threatened
harm or evil, and (5) the actions taken to avoid the harm must sup-
port a reasonable belief or inference that the actions would be effec-
tive in avoiding or alleviating the impending harm.
Having pronounced these basic principles, the Supreme Court
then declared that the defense of justification is only available to a
defendant who presents the trial court with an offer of proof that
establishes the following: (1) that the actor was faced with a clear
and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or speculative; (2)
that the actor could reasonably expect that his actions would be ef-
fective in avoiding this greater harm; (3) that there was no legal
alternative which would be effective in abating the harm; and (4)
that the legislature had not acted to preclude the defense by a clear
and deliberate choice regarding the matter at issue. These four cir-
cumstances that must coalesce if the defense is to be available are
the same four elements described by the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals in Commonwealth v. Brugmann.196 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court went one step further, however, and put a floor under the de-
fense, insisting on a "minimum standard" in order to support that
defense.19 7
The Supreme Court then proceeded to briefly apply these prin-
ciples to the facts of the protest trespass at the Shippingport nuclear
plant. The court concluded that the danger at the nuclear plant was
not imminent and that the defendants' conduct was not "necessary"
to avoid harm. The conduct in question could neither have termi-
196. 13 Mass. App. Ct. 373, 433 N.E.2d 457 (1982).
197.
It is essential that the offer meet a minimum standard as to each element of the
defense so that if a jury finds it to be true, it would support the affirmative
defense of necessity.
Where the proffered evidence supporting one element of the defense, even if
believed, is insufficient to sustain the defense, the trial court has the right to
deny use of the defense and not burden the jury with testimony supporting other
elements of the defense.
Pa. at - , 498 A.2d at 809.
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nated nor reduced the danger which the defendants claimed was con-
fronting them. The court ended by noting that the failure of the de-
fendants to raise the defense of justification provided by Section 510
of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code precluded appellate consideration
of that claim.
2. Commonwealth v. Berrigan.198-The Berrigan opinion of
the supreme court followed Capitolo by but two months and, as one
would expect, was a unanimous reiteration of the views expressed in
Capitolo. Certain rulings, however, supplemented the principles pro-
nounced in Capitolo. The court held that the defense of justification
was not available where the conduct some perceived as engendering
public disaster was specifically approved by the Legislature. The
court further required that the same four elements itemized as nec-
essary to any offer of proof if the defense of justification under Sec-
tion 503 was to be available were likewise required if the defense of
justification under Section 510 was to be available.199
When the supreme court reviewed the conduct of the defendants
in light of the principles it had established in these decisions, it de-
termined that the trial court had properly ruled that the offer of
proof was insufficient to establish that the nuclear holocaust sought
to be averted by the defendants was a clear and imminent public
disaster. It also determined that the trial court had properly rejected
the offer of expert testimony upon the hazards of the improper use of
nuclear energy since such hazards are so commonly known to the
general public that expert testimony upon the subject was not neces-
sary; and that the destructive nature of nuclear weaponry was not
the harm with which the defendants were confronted when they tres-
passed onto the plant. The plant the defendants entered only pro-
duced bombshell casings; the mere manufacture of bombshell cas-
ings cannot be viewed as the type of dangerous activity which would
or could result in a public disaster. Finally, the court held that the
actions chosen by the defendants could not under any hypothesis rea-
sonably be expected to be effective in avoiding the perceived public
disaster of a nuclear holocaust.20 °
It seems that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has shaped the
Pennsylvania justification statute to very much resemble the common
law defense of necessity. Moreover, since the pronouncements of the
198. - Pa. - , 501 A.2d 226 (1985).
199. Id. at 501 A.2d at 229.
200. Id. at -, 501 A.2d at 250.
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court were so certain and unanimous, the interpretation provided will
likely prevail for quite some time.
VII. Conclusions
A.
The defense of justification is simply not available to the protes-
tor who, in the conduct of a demonstration, violates the law.2"' Nor
may the acceptance of the defense of justification by the court in the
case of United States v. Patrick,"2 be viewed as an exception to this
conclusion for the reason that the purpose of the charged misconduct
in that case was not one of demonstration or protest.
B.
The courts in rejecting the applicability of the defense of justifi-
cation to anti-war and anti-nuclear demonstrators rely heavily upon
the lack of imminence in the attendant evil sought to be averted, and
upon the lack of a reasonable expectation that the evil would be
averted by the unlawful act of the protestor as well. Those bases
would not seem to preclude the use of the defense of justification by
pro-life demonstrators since the evil they seek to avert, namely, abor-
tion, is, as the protestors block clients from access to the clinic, not
only imminent, but is effectively averted by the blockade. The pres-
ence of imminency and effectiveness, however, does not make the
defense of justification viable, for, as we have seen from the decisions
herein reviewed, so long as abortion during the first trimester is law-
ful, protestors may not engage in unlawful conduct in an effort to
preclude conduct which has been determined by statute or decision
to be lawful, no matter how immoral or evil the protestors may view
that behavior.
C.
Some courts in rejecting the application of the defense of justifi-
cation conclude that the accused was not confronted with a choice of
evils because alternate means of averting the perceived evil were
available to the accused. For example, alternate means include lob-
bying the legislature to change a law, persuading an administrative
201. "Virtually all courts which have ruled on necessity and like defenses in cases within
the scope of this annotation have found them to fail. ... Annot., 41 ALR 4th 773, 777
(1985).
202. 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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agency to amend a regulation or arousing public opinion. More often
than not, however, the suggestion of an alternative is but theoretical,
a factor which triggers a criticism that the opinion of the deciding
court is contrived and specious. It is, therefore, preferable for the
courts to restrict their reliance upon the existence of an alternative
method to cases where the alternative is realistic.
D.
As much as we must admire the deeds of Mohandas Karam-
chand Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as disciples of civil
disobedience, their enormous accomplishments should also serve to
enhance the efficacy of the doctrine itself. Those achievements
should inspire serious concern about the efficacy of purpose of those
protestors who violate the law only to plead justification. Indeed, a
protest effort that includes destruction is counterproductive.
One apt description of the destructive protestor was provided by
the United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens when,
as a member of the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, he rejected the necessity defense203 that had been presented by
one accused of the destruction of selective service records during an
anti-war protest:
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own
hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability
to determine policy is superior to democratic decision making.
Appellant's professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justifi-
cation, actually identifies a form of arrogance which organized
society cannot tolerate. ' "
E.
A trial court is well advised, in the event that an accused seeks
to present the defense of justification, to rely during its analysis upon
the ruling of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Commonwealth
v. Brugmann10 5 which delineates the four elements that must coa-
lesce if the defense is to be available and describes the procedures to
be employed if the defense is to be presented.
203. See United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
204. Id. at 392.




The defense of justification presents a most perplexing issue that
is quite aptly mirrored in the striking and thoughtful rhetoric of Sir
Thomas More, as he rose from Chancellor to sainthood by way of
the scaffold:
MORE: [Would you] cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you - where would you hide,
Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted
thick with laws from coast to coast . . . and if you
cut them down . . . d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
safety's sake.
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